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Abstract 
 
In this paper I argue that we can usefully address the nature, significance and range of 
effects of the OMC for Education and Training by adopting the theoretical perspectives 
on space, place and scale from the fields of economic geography and state theory. In 
particular, the distinctions offered by Collinge (1999), Brenner (2001), Jessop (2004, 
2005) and Barbier (2004) provide a framework for investigating and problematising 
some of the sedimented and increasingly common sense assessments of the production 
of the European education space, the activities and practices in the Brussels policy 
places and the production of a scale of authority at the EU level. Methodologically, this 
paper follows Scharpf (2001) in wanting to pursue lines of argumentation which outline 
clear distinctions which make a difference in the way in which we conceive of the 
subjects and objects of study. The aim is to go against the grain of judgements which 
have become common place and which cut at the joints of  explanations which have 
been offered. 
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Introduction 
The Lisbon Strategy, the launch of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) and the 
developments as part of the ‘Education and Training 2010’ work programme have led to 
intense academic study of the meanings, significance and effects of a European Union 
profile in education policy development. This paper adopts a scale-theoretic approach to 
provides a critical assessment of the research conducted to date, an identification of the 
theoretical and methodological problems which are developing and suggestions about 
how notions of space, place and scale within an approach to multi-level governance, can 
open up ways for moving beyond what have become the sedimented sets of questions 
about and explanations for the development of an EU education policy. 
 
Lisbon and the OMC – what do we think we know?  
 
The origins of the Lisbon Strategy and the development of the OMC as the new 
governance paradigm have been explained in a number of ways. The standard view is 
that the OMC developed out of the European Employment Strategy and that the causes 
of that strategy apply equally to other social policy areas. According to this view 
(Streeck, 1996), the completion of the single market, the moves to monetary union and 
the establishment of the Stability and Growth Pact produced new and common 
problems related to growth, jobs and social cohesion.  The EES was ‘thus an answer and 
solution to a twofold unbalance generated by the acceleration of EU economic 
integration: an unbalance generated by the acceleration of EU economic integration: an 
unbalance between highly integrated EU monetary policies and insufficient macro-
economic coordination, an unbalance between EU economic integration over EU social 
integration’ (Goetschy, 2004, p. 2) At the same time, the diversity of social policy 
regimes and treaty provisions about subsidiarity and national competence meant that the 
path-finding EES provided a template for achieving ‘a feasible balance between the 
need to respect diversity among member states, and the unity – and meaning – of 
common EU action’ (Borras and Jacobsson, 2004, p. 186) In sum, there was a common 
structure of problems and the need to find comparable and coherent answers and even 
perhaps ‘common responses in areas where legal competences rest with the member 
states’ (Borras and Jacobsson, 2004, p. 186) And the underlying rationale is that the 
necessity of the development of an EU profile in social policy areas is based on an 
economy of scale argument: it is more efficient and effective to deal with common 
problems in a common way rather than individually. The political, contradictory and 
conflictual element of such seemingly fateful decisions is framed in terms of the 
regaining of sovereignty ‘in the hope of recreating the social protection capabilities that 
are eroding at the national level’ (Scharpf, 2001, p. 13) 
 
The Lisbon Strategy is an assertion of common challenges and a wish list of aspirations. 
The OMC is presented as making it possible for a common EU policy repertoire to be 
developed on the basis of new activities, development of a common political, economic 
and sociological discourse and  the dissemination of policy ideas throughout the 
European space and at all scales of governance and activity. Policy preferences and 
choices would be modified as a result. The presumed mechanism for all this would be 
cognitive coordination and increasing socialisation of actors to their new European 
identities and roles and the methods would be the EES tool box of common objectives, 
indicators, benchmarks and peer learning. A review of the OMC literature (Pochet, 
2001, Borras and Jacobsson 2004, Schaefer, 2004) gives further specifications of how   4
the OMC is expected to achieve its effects and through which mechanisms. (See Table 
1)  
 
OMC Policy 
Activity 
OMC Policy 
Outcomes 
OMC Policy 
Mechanisms 
Agenda-setting 
Agenda-interpretation 
Agenda-amplification 
Negotiations 
Problem-solving 
Decisions 
 
Problem definition 
Problem awareness 
Problem interaction 
Problem solutions 
Problem implications 
Changed values 
Changed preferences 
Changed governance 
Changed systems 
Changed system 
content  
Discourse 
Indicators 
Benchmarks 
Peer Learning 
Actor identity formation 
Rules of the game 
Politicization 
De-politicization 
Economization 
De-economization 
Supranationalization 
Intergovernmentalization 
 
Table. 1. OMC Activity, Outcomes, Effects and Mechanisms 
 
 
As with so much of the literature on policy learning, policy transfer and the 
institutionalist perspectives of norming and forming, too little of the context and agency 
of learners and teachers in the processes is considered. What we get is the sociologically 
rather thin notions of trust, mutual accountability and coming to change through coming 
to value through coming to know. So from  Hingel (2001) , we get the view that  ‘The 
‘Europeanization’ of education has provoked the development of a strong feeling of 
‘mutual accountability’ between Ministers of Education’ (Hingel, 2001, p. 13) Policy 
development is supposed to happen through inherently social and psychological 
processes ranging from the rarefied and rational ’Learning on the basis of deliberation’ 
(Gornitzka, 2005, p. 4), to the punitive and disciplinary modes of naming and shaming 
all the way through to the affective and subtle shaping of policy language and 
standardisation.  
 
Much of the thinking about Lisbon and the OMC have worked with an implicit version 
of governmentality. The focus has been on the identification of technologies and 
mechanisms of governance which ‘contract, consult, negotiate, create partnerships, 
empower and activate forms of agency, liberty and the choice of individuals in their 
different capacities. However, they also set norms, standards, benchmarks, performance 
indicators, quality controls and best practice standards, to monitor, measure and render 
calculable the performance of these various individuals or agencies’ (Haahr, 2004, p. 
216) I would argue that, in the end too much of the writing about the OMC has 
difficulty in accommodating agents, strategies, resistance and hierarchies of power. And 
it is the identification of the importance of these which constitutes the major gap in our 
understanding.  
 
Lisbon and the OMC – what don’t we know? 
 
In terms of the OMC for education and training, I would argue that surprisingly little 
attention has been paid to the fact that this is education policy development; rather there 
is a tendency to address education policy by analogy with other areas of social policy, in 
particular the European Employment Strategy. And yet, for all the talk of the 
importance of education and training policy within human capital and innovation 
policy, the histories of education reform rhetoric and practices have received little   5
attention. The common position is that taken by Gornitzka (2005) in emphasising the 
‘sensitivity’ of national education policy as if that were the key constraint on multi-level 
EU governance engagement with national and EU policy development. What seems to 
be missing is the sense that education policy as a distinct field has always been the site 
of competing strategies and constructions and that there is no necessary link between 
policy and scale. In sum then, I would argue that we need to adopt the Ginsburg et al 
(1990) position that ‘reform rhetoric may not be concretely connected with efforts to 
change anything fundamentally about schools. In this case the object may be to define 
what the problems and possible solutions are, even if no sustained effort is launched’ 
(Ginsburg et al, 1990, p. 493) I would argue that we still know far too little about why, 
under what conditions and with what expected effects, actors are developing education 
policy at the European level. The strategic selectivity of activity, the opportunities and 
resources, the competitive core to the cooperative mode, these are all areas which we do 
not know enough about.  
 
I would suggest that one of the reasons for this is that the naming of the Open Method 
of Coordination and its application to the field of education policy has produced a 
curious reification of the object of study; what was conceived of as a process becomes, 
through the activities of study and conceptualisation an object with causal powers. The 
effect of this is to produce a view of EU education policy processes as a coherent and 
sustainable body of policy activity which very much like the stately glide of the swan, 
disguises the efforts, strategic shifts and almost impossible nature of the underlying 
mechanics. The ‘official’ view of the OMC for education is that it has developed over 
the long run and been strategically brokered by entrepreneurial actors from the 
Commission and the Member States (Corbett, 2003, Hingel, 2001). This view is 
difficult to square with the idea that ‘OMCs can be launched (and dropped) easily’ 
(NewGov, 2005, p. 17) or the ways in which OMCs have tended to morph into the 
ideal-type OMC, the European Employment Strategy. The dynamics of movement and 
maintenance, the experimentation and failure, the shifts in focus and the contingencies 
of bigger politics and economics all tend to fall outside of analysis. As a result we are in 
no position to even speculate about what will happen when the 2010 deadline has come 
and gone or what would condition the development or atrophication of EU education 
policy at that point.   
 
A central role within the OMC is accorded to discourse. EU level discourses are 
supposedly producing a space with a shared policy vision, a shared policy language and 
a shared sense of a common destiny. What I would call ‘discourse mystification’ is 
perhaps the most difficult areas for us to even think. It would be counter-intuitive to 
assert that when all actors are speaking from the same script in choreographed policy 
moves over regular cycles of policy making performance, that this is entirely 
insignificant. But the most important contemporary literature on discourse 
analysis(Blommaert, 2005) calls upon us to think again about the contexts of meaning 
and interpretation and the fundamentally social nature of language as interaction. As 
soon as we introduce the logic of dramaturgy then we have to abandon our suspension 
of disbelief and see the theatricality and artificiality of the policy stage, the arbitrariness 
of the institutional décor and the ambiguities in terms of audience.. This is something of 
a commonplace but it bears repeating: what appears to be significant changes in 
language and discourse can be no such thing. At the same time, sharing the same 
discourse ‘is certainly not incompatible with an extreme variety of domestic economic 
and social policies, which can be globally correlated to very different social ‘outcomes’, 
in terms of redistribution, well-being and inequality, even in a context where monetary 
norms are prominent in the global international economy’ (Barbier, 2004, p. 14) Again,   6
one of the core tenets of thinking about the OMC seems to rest on the flimsiest of 
discursive theories. We really need to remember that policy discourse is often little 
more than cant and that we cannot assume ‘a wide-spread homogenisation of ideas 
across all European countries’ (Barbier, 2005, p. 63) A contrarian view would want to 
ask questions about the depth and importance of the repetition of discourses which are 
hardly novel, the involvement of small elites, the question of only superficial adaptation 
to the rules of  highly specific Brussels contexts with particular rules of recognition and 
the multiple identities of policy actors. 
 
 
I would also suggest that we are still very far from being able to think about what has 
been called the ‘significance and effects debate’ at the level of actors participating in the 
processes (Dale, 2004). Clearly, initiatives have been launched, indicators drawn up, 
benchmarks agreed, networks established, policy papers written of which some have 
been through the deliberations of the range of EU institutions to emerge as EU policy 
recommendations. And all of these things have involved people acting as 
representatives of governments, civil services, special interest groups, academic 
communities etc. At some level this is a significant phenomenon.  As Walters and 
Haahr (2005) make clear, there is a clear empirical significance to the fact that, in the 
case of Denmark, 140 national civil servants not previously involved in EU affairs are 
now shuttling backwards and forwards involved in OMC processes.  What they do there 
or what they do back in Denmark is quite another matter however. Again, it would be 
difficult to argue that there has been nothing of significance going on. As Barbier says, 
‘because representatives of national administrations have been constantly involved in 
these activities, Member States have had to adjust their traditional work and functioning 
accordingly. Other actors – like for instance social partners’ organisations – also have 
had to devote new resources to be able to participate in these activities’ (Barbier, 2004, 
p. 5) At the level of actors involvement  in institutional activity though , I would suggest 
that we still understand far too little about who is taking part, in what ways, with what 
kinds of authority and that until we do we will not be able to move forward with even 
the definition of what might be a significant effect. 
 
 
The establishment of working groups and networks is again at a certain level 
significant. They create the opportunity for policy spaces and places to be developed 
and for ideas to be tested. It is a big leap from this however to the positions outlined by 
Lawn and Lingard, that we are witnessing the establishment of a  ‘new ‘magistracy of 
influence’ in the European educational policy domain: a policy elite that acts across 
borders, displays a similar habitus, have a feel for the same policy game and are, in a 
sense, bearers of an emergent European educational policy and policy space’ (Lawn and 
Lingard, 2002, p. 292) In Wallace’s (2001)  terms, the establishment of networks in and 
of itself tells us nothing about the degree of delegation of authority to the networks. For 
Gornitzka ‘Some of these working groups function as organised arenas used by the 
Commission as ‘hired help’ for developing recommendation and action plans that the 
Commission has been charged to develop by the Council’ (Gornitzka, 2005, p. 19) In 
his study of the development of EU health policy, Guigner (2004) questions the degree 
to which the formation of expert networks has been able to be mobilised for the 
development of EU policy. The key question might well be the extent to which experts 
are allowed to function in a parallel world to the political world which in the end grants 
or does not grant them status. The development of networks of influence seemingly 
spreading like a web throughout the European education space and coming to form  an 
increasingly ‘thick’ and ‘dense’ tapestry of policy  formation is perhaps most clearly   7
articulated by Lawn and Lingard (2002). For them, ‘significant policy actors in 
education are working today face to face and virtually in joint governmental projects 
and networking translating, mediating and constructing educational policies’ (Lawn and 
Lingard, 2002, p. 290) But what happens if the core features of this description start to 
look more than a little threadbare, does the notional significance of this start to fall apart 
too? What if the actors are not significant? What if the working has more in common 
with masks and unstable identities, with saving face and making the right faces rather 
than with open and deliberative joint action? What if the translation, mediation and 
construction has more to do with strategic selectivity rather than making common 
cause? In sum, what if the networks are apparatuses for the playing out of existing 
policy dynamics rather than the construction of new ones? Again, we can speculate 
about the influence and importance of networks but we really have very little idea about 
their significance for policy. 
 
Of course, the weaknesses of the OMC in terms of national policy reform have been 
well-recognised. However, I think it is important to specify exactly where the 
weaknesses lie.  Reading against the grain of analyses which focus on behaviour 
modification through being made accountable, I would want to draw attention to the 
capacity of policy actors to engage in practices which fundamentally redefine the terms 
of both surveillance and accountability. So the involvement of national actors in the 
reporting of national policy can take the form of ‘producing detailed national reports, 
more for the benefit of promoting national policies than to comply with EU strategic 
goals’ (Boras and Greves, 2004, p. 333) The production of indicators and benchmarks is 
never neutral and  the validity of both assessment and evaluation is always contestable. 
To be named and shamed is hardly likely to be accepted unconditionally and ‘naming 
and shaming, one of the more vaunted aspects of the method cannot bite if the shamed 
can retort that indicators do not capture the specificities of the situation’ (NewGov, 
2005, p. 31) And even before the use of indicators reaches the point at which 
disciplinary surveillance could have an effect, there is ample scope for ‘participants to 
manipulate the evidence to what is seen to be required’ (Arrowsmith et al, 2004, p. 321) 
In terms of Peer Learning too, the experience in other policy domains and institutional 
settings tends to indicate that there is plenty of scope for a refusal of the position which 
audit constructs on the grounds that ‘the process is flawed by such factors as unqualified 
examiners, bias stemming from national interests, or inadequate standards or criteria’ 
(Pagani, 2002, p. 13) In essence the supposed mechanisms of policy development will 
always leave plenty of scope for a refusal by actors representing particular interests to 
go along with the programmes logic, instead substituting their own.   
 
Running, throughout these lacunae in our knowledge and understanding are two 
propositions. The first is that without detailed, on the ground, ethnographic, inside 
involvement, participation and observation, developing a concrete understanding of  the 
actions, motivations, choices and importance of actors involved in these processes will 
always be beyond us. Secondly, there is the nagging doubt that for all the activity, the 
OMC for education and training might appear, partly through academic study of it, as 
more significant than it actually is. And there is an unavoidable question then, at what 
point do we address the sites where policy, EU-inspired, EU-friendly or EU-resistant, is 
implemented. For Barbier, any EU level policy ‘would remain a pure fiction (a pure 
symbol, in a way) were it not explicitly grafted onto national policies, which are 
embedded in their existing systems of social protection’ (Barbier, 2004, p. 4) 
   8
Space, Place and Scale 
 
The difficulties in thinking about the OMC for education and training are perhaps best 
demonstrated by recognition of the fecundity with which researchers have attempted to 
produce an adequate vocabulary for the dynamics of policy development.  Should we be 
talking about  ‘Trans- rather than supranational’(Borras and Jacobsson, 2004, p. 201)? 
Is it ‘intensive trans-governmentalism’(Wallace, 2001, p. 592)? Or is it intensified neo-
voluntarism (Streeck, 1996) Are the actors engaged in ‘Competitive solidarity’ (Streeck, 
1999). If we are talking about ‘reinforced cooperation’ (Borras and Jacobsson, 2004, p. 
185), what is the significance of force and what impact does this have on cooperation? 
Clearly the difficulty arises in trying to analyse the interactions of ‘economic and social 
policy in and across many different scales of action with the participation of a wide 
range of official, quasi-official, private economic interests, and representatives of civil 
society’ (Jessop, 2004, p. 58) I would argue though that in addition to a reconsideration 
of the efficacy of the conceptual terrain which the OMC presents to us, we need to 
revisit the lines of force, the conditions which produce fields of opportunity and 
constraint and the structural conditions for the actions of agents within the field of 
education policy. And it is here, I will argue, that a scale-theoretic approach can make 
an important contribution.   
 
Some attempts have been made to think about the meaning, significance and effects of 
the OMC for education and training using a scale approach. The problem so far though 
has been that scale arguments have transposed to the EU scale, arguments which were 
more common in thinking about the state and education policy. So, Robertson and Dale 
(2003), suggested that what they termed a functional and scalar division of labour was 
developing in which we might see signs that  ‘the focus of European activity in the 
educational sphere, at both the supranational and the national levels will be on the 
capacity of education systems rather than their mandate or their governance, and on 
their effectiveness rather than their efficiency’ (Robertson and Dale, 2003, p. 12) The 
attempt to map particular functions to particular scales of activity tends to assume a 
rather too neat scalar division and functional division. What is missing is a relational 
sense that capacity, mandate, effectiveness and efficiency are inextricably linked and 
therefore that any activity at any scale would need to deal with challenges 
simultaneously. I would argue that the scalar division of labour approach would be 
usefully developed by a clearer analytical focus on distinctions between space, place 
and scale combined with an empirical examination of what aspects of education policy 
with what kinds of interconnectedness are being worked through. My intention here is 
not to adopt a scale-centric approach which would be akin to transposing to the EU 
level the faults of a state-centric approach with all the attendant functionalist and 
normative baggage that comes with it. Rather, I argue that a scale-theoretic approach 
which  makes possible the identification of a repertoire of scalar positions at which 
experimental and path-seeking policy practices and regimes are developed. 
 
 
Collinge (1999) provides three possible categories for thinking about scale within 
complex multi-level governance arrangements. For him, a useful heuristic is to think in 
terms of dominant scales, nodal scales and marginal scales. Dominant scales are able to 
exercise power over institutions at other scales; nodal scales are not dominant overall 
but are important for the development of certain activities which may have impacts on 
other scales; marginal scales are important as sites of the management of resistance. I 
would argue that using this kind of framework makes it possible to conceive of the   9
processes of the OMC for education and training as being about the conflicts 
surrounding what form of scale the EU is. 
 
Brenner (2001), develops an additional perspective on scale. His emphasis is on the 
political contestation which leads to processes by which ‘entrenched scalar 
configurations are continually junked and remade through intense socio-political 
struggles’ (Brenner, 2001, p. 592) Such struggles take place in particular places in 
which the capacity to influence the junking  and remaking is contingent on the relations 
between the place,  scale and space. In Brenner’s terms then, the European education 
space is made, defined and struggled over in particular institutional spaces in Brussels 
by actors who derive their legitimacy and actorliness from other (national and sub-
national) spaces.  
 
Now, the conceptualisation of the EU as a complex field of overlapping, nested and 
related authority and influence does not begin with theories of scale. The multi-level 
governance literature addressed precisely this point. However, too often the 
vocabularies of multi-level governance produce a limited view of the EU as  ‘composed 
of distinct policy making levels’ when  ‘rather it should be used to explore the EU as a 
highly fluid system of governance, characterised by the complex interpenetration of the 
national, sub-national and supranational; as a multi-perspectival domain of complex 
overlapping spaces with a multi-level institutional architecture and a dispersion of 
authority’ (Rosamond, 2001, p. 160) What I think is added to the power of the analysis 
is a sense of the struggle and resources for struggle over the architecture of interaction 
in which places and spaces are dialectically related.  If we add to this the analytical 
distinctions between in Barbier’s (2004) terms, the places which serve as forums or 
arenas, I think we come closer to being able to address the absence of strategic actors in 
too much of the literature on the OMC.  
 
One further development of a scale-theoretical perspective is particularly useful. Jessop  
sees ‘self-reflexive irony’ as an important component of the social ontology of the 
actors within governance practices as they grapple with the ‘distinctive modalities of 
success, failure, tension, crisis, reflexivity and crisis management’ (Jessop, 2004, p. 73) 
For Jessop, a multi-scalar ensemble of institutions and social relations such as the EU 
needs to be seen as necessarily involved in an unstable, restless, and reflexive search for 
articulations of regimes and modes of government/governance in the face of continual 
market, state and governance failures (Jessop,2004, p.49). Irony in this sense is a mode 
of behaviour and the analysis of OMC can usefully be framed within a recognition of 
how the instability of context and the uncertainty of outcome will produce provisional 
and contingent institutional and discursive modifications. The analysis of such 
modifications needs to take place within a framework which embraces instability, 
frames the instability adequately in terms of temporality and relative durability and sees 
modification as the result of actors self-reflexive and  strategically selective choices.  
 
As an antidote to the reification of OMC processes and with a view to opening up ways 
of addressing the gaps in our knowledge and understanding of the OMC processes, I 
would want to argue that what we have witnessed is part of a restless search for a 
productive scale for the governance of the European and national policy spaces which 
takes place through ‘everyday habits, routines, practices, negotiations, experiments, 
conflicts and struggles’ (Brenner, 2001, p. 605) I would argue that such an approach is 
indispensable because as Wallace asserts, ‘the daily practice of the EU refuse to settle 
into a sufficiently regular pattern for its political processes to be clearly defined’ 
(Wallace, 2001, p. 581). In addition though, Jessop’s ironic perspective helps to address   10
the necessarily tentative and exploratory nature of space, place and scale dynamics 
within the OMC because it helps us to face Brenner’s suitably ironic view that ’the mere 
existence of scalar organization does not, ipso facto, result in sociological or politically 
relevant scale effects’ (Brenner, 2001, p. 601) 
 
 
Space, Place and Scale: the OMC Education and Training 2010 
 
So what kinds of questions are opened up for an analysis of this particular OMC by 
scale-theoretic approaches?  
 
In terms of the Commission at the heart of the process, I would argue that it has been 
able to use its powers of initiative to promote policies which construct the European 
education space which provides it with its legitimacy and sources of claims for 
legitimacy. It is only because of its super-vision that it has been able to claim the right 
to supervise. In this sense the collection of indicators and national reports has been 
fundamentally important for its position as coordinator-in-chief of the processes. The 
Commission’s establishment of networks have been a part of this since they allow for a 
genuine sense of knowing and being involved in education policy communities 
throughout the European education space. And its position in terms of space and place 
is remarkably secure. As Gornitzka says, ‘its position would be hard to fill for any other 
national administration, or international organisations’ secretariat as it connects 
permanent administrative capacity with trans-national actors, agencies and national 
administrations, and not in the least provides the link to the general infrastructure of the 
EU outside the education sector’ (Gorntizka, 2007, p. 27) The Commission’s role within 
the Brussels places is equally unassailable. Commission actors act within the rules and 
obligations which are clearly established for such places and participants in policy 
formation would obviously be expected to respond to the Commission in terms of its 
secure position within the Brussels spaces. What happens outside the Brussels spaces 
would be another matter altogether.  
 
And the Brussels places have been filled with all sorts of productive activity. Since 
2000 there is no area of education policy which has not been addressed in one way or 
another. Table 2 gives a select  overview of policy development around the key 
questions of governance of education (goals, objective and policy mechanisms),   
education system management (size of system, systemacity of system, financial 
sustainability of system) and content of education (curriculum, assessment, quality and 
pedagogy). If anyone is left in any doubt about the inadequacy of notions of subsidiarity 
in making aspects of education policy off limits, this surely provides the proof. The 
notion of supplementary and complementary activities is surely too, pushed to the very 
edges of semantic angels dancing on the heads of pins. The treaty as it stands is not 
being defended and certainly not by its supposed guardian the Commission. 
 
Within the Brussels places, the Commission has clearly been called upon to fulfil a 
wide-range of roles. Using Barbier’s distinction between forum and arena where the 
arena is the place where scalar struggles take place, we might conceive of Commission 
roles according to the typology in Table 3. It should not be forgotten though that the 
Commission’s roles are also available as a resource for other actors in the Brussels 
places as well as the EU and national spaces and scales.. The Commission can be the 
scapegoat for unpopular decisions (Boras and Greves, 2004, p. 332). It can be the 
practical orchestrator for processes which are seen as necessary but for which sufficient   11
 
 
 
Activities  Policy Area  EU Education Policy 
Goals and objectives  Lifelong Learning  
Knowledge Economy 
Knowledge Society 
European Education 
Space 
Policy making power structure 
 
Common principles 
Best practice 
Benchmarks/indicators 
Policy learning 
National Reports 
European tools and 
mechanisms 
Quality assurance 
Competition between 
models 
International outcome 
measures 
Evidence based policy 
Governance Activities 
Finance/budget processes 
 
% GDP 
Public/private 
contributions 
Efficiency/equity 
Inputs/outcomes 
Size and number of students, teachers, 
administrator, buildings 
 
Teacher shortages, 
demography and teacher 
training 
System organisation – types/status of 
institutions 
 
System organisation – links between 
institutions; age of transition 
Education and Training 
Formal, informal and 
non-formal 
Credit transfer 
European Qualifications 
Framework 
Pre-school Education 
Early/later tracking 
System Management 
Level of funding 
 
Efficiency and equity 
EU Social Funds 
Research Framework 
Funds 
European Investment 
Bank 
Curriculum Content  Key competences 
Curriculum Assessment  Outcomes-based 
EQF 
 
Content 
Pedagogy 
 
e-learning 
Teacher as facilitator 
 
Table 2. EU Education Policy 
 
consensus would not be available (Gornitzka, 2005, p. 19) In sum, I would suggest that 
we can start to talk about strategic behaviours and identities more clearly by adopting 
some scale theoretic distinctions. 
   12
 
Commission Policy Roles 
Forum 
•  Pace-setter 
•  Motivator 
•  Counsellor 
•  Role model 
Arena 
•  Agenda-setter 
•  Negotiator 
•  Manipulator 
•  Arbiter 
•  Problem-solver 
 
Table 3. Commission Policy Roles 
 
And of course we might expect that strategic selectivity would play a role in the 
movements between forums and arenas with all of the implications which this carries in 
terms of spatial and scalar struggles. We would  need to continue to recognise that 
activity in Brussels can provide the means to counter ‘more slow and more conservative 
development of Ministries and National educational authorities’ (Hingel, 2001, p. 14) 
And of course what I am arguing is that the notion of place-specific and shifting roles 
would not just apply to the Commission but could be used to develop a typology of 
roles for all actors in the Brussels spaces and more widely throughout the European 
education space in their interactions with EU policy development.  
 
The Politics of Scale  
 
Clearly though, when activity moves from being place specific towards having scalar 
significance, we could expect that micro- and macro- politics would play an 
increasingly important role. In Table 4, I present a selected overview of education 
policy development within the OMC. What the table represents is an attempt to specify 
which policies have achieved which degree of what I call Institutionalisation as 
Rescaling. What seems to have happened is an increasing development of the EU as a 
scale of governance in particular areas. The areas are clearly associated with the degree 
of functional interdependence between Member States as part of an EU with which has 
a dominant as opposed to a nodal or marginal scalar profile.  
 
The role of the EU as a dominant scale of education policy is more pronounced the 
more the education field is a functional part of bigger and broader transfer of 
competencies. So, for example, what the national adoption of particular models of fees, 
loans and grants means is that the definition and viability of national policies for 
national citizens as opposed to EU citizens, becomes increasingly problematic and calls 
for forms of coordination at the EU level. Education policy is therefore implicated in the 
more general sense that ‘national social policy projects will in future have to be 
scrutinized for their financial and political compatibility with international 
commitments to cross-border mobility, with some likely to be ruled out as 
incompatible’ (Streeck, 1996, p. 84)‘ 
 
The EU would be more properly considered as a nodal scale in policy areas which have 
not made it above the level of the Bologna Process. The Bologna Process can perhaps 
be seen as the farthest edge of the Open Method of Coordination and the importance of 
universities, the agenda of innovation, creativity and the knowledge economy, the focus 
on the capacity to enhance capital accumulation, growth and jobs, leads credence to the 
sense that Member States have made a fateful commitment to a common destiny within 
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Policy Area 
 
Institutional 
Scale and Intensity 
Market-
creating 
policies 
Market-
enabling 
policies 
Process 
policies 
Welfare 
state 
policies 
Knowledge 
Economy/Society 
Fiscal 
equalization 
policies 
 
Supranational Services 
Directive 
 
 
Mutual 
recognition of 
qualifications; 
children of 
migrant 
workers; 
VET; 
The 
European 
Dimension 
of loans, fees 
and grants 
 European 
Investment Bank 
 
Joint Decision     EQF, 
Efficiency 
and Equity, 
Lifelong 
Learning, 
Key 
competences 
   Research 
Framework; 
European 
Institute of 
Technology; 
Integrated 
Lifelong 
Learning 
Programme 
European 
Social Funds, 
Research 
frameworks, 
Mobility 
programmes 
Enhanced 
Intergovernmentalism 
                                       THE BOLOGNA PROCESS 
Lisbon Strategy and 
the 
Intergovernmental 
Bologna 
Process   
Bologna 
Process  
Spring 
European 
Council  
    
Lisbon Strategy and 
the Open  Method of 
coordination 
   Education 
and Training 
Joint Reports 
 
National 
Progress 
Reports 
 
Policy 
Networks 
and Policy 
Clusters 
 
Learning as 
competences 
and 
outcomes 
OMCs for 
European 
Employment 
Strategies 
and Social 
Cohesion  
Common 
objectives and 
indicators, 5 
‘benchmarks’, 
per capita spend, 
migrants and 
social cohesion; 
language policy, 
European 
dimension; 
Lisbon 
Strategy 
Functional 
Interdependence 
Education 
as tradable 
commodity; 
Competitive 
knowledge 
economy 
strategies; 
Mobility of 
labour; 
Education as 
visible 
comparable 
sector  
 
Sustainable 
funding 
models; 
recognition 
of prior 
qualifications 
and 
experience 
Education 
for identity, 
active 
citizenship, 
migrant 
populations 
Trans-European 
Research 
Economies of 
Scale; Research, 
innovation and 
teaching clusters;  
education and 
training for social 
services 
Regional 
development 
and 
knowledge 
concentrations 
Common concerns  Education 
and 
competition 
Education 
and economic 
and social 
cohesion 
Education 
governance 
Welfare 
reform 
Europeanisation 
and Education: 
sustainable 
growth, jobs and 
social cohesion 
Combined 
and uneven 
development 
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Table 4. Institutionalisation as Rescaling in EU Education Policy 
 
a European Higher Education space without of course (quite) subsuming it within a 
Commission aspiration towards an EU scalar hierarchy.  
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The bulk of the Education and Training 2010 Work Programme sits in the EU scale 
which is most plausibly considered potentially either nodal or marginal. It remains to be 
seen which policy areas will gain the status of having Recommendations formed, 
negotiated and agreed with the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament 
although it is probably a fair bet to say that Member States will continue to treat them 
even if they do as marginal scales in terms of their own policy developments. In 
Gornitzka’s terms, the national scale will continue to be ‘tugged at by the embryonic 
development of common European standards’ (Gorntizka, 2007, p. 220 
  
If we attempt to draws up a balance sheet, a template for recording the extent to which 
these processes are settling into a relatively stable scalar, spatial and place specific fix, a 
number of areas can be considered. A crucial dimension here then is the strategies of the 
actors involved. It has become something of a common-place to think of the OMC as 
integration with the brakes on, a concerted attempt to construct both opportunities and 
constraints in the construction of the spaces, places and scales of the EU. Trying to 
identify the opportunities then becomes important. The dimensions of the EU as scale 
might be usefully framed in terms of the opportunities to use the Brussels arenas and 
forums as relatively sealed places in which policy can be considered, developed, 
embraced and rejected at a distance from the domestic arenas and forums. National 
states will continue control which policies areas go up or down and when they do agree 
to policies being addressed in different places with different scalar implications, they 
will do so in ways which retain their powers to limit the implications for national 
autonomy. (Jessop, 2004).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have argued that a series of sedimented views of the Lisbon Strategy and 
the Open Method of Coordination have developed which too often read with the grain 
of the supposed dynamics of education policy development. The result has been that 
there has been too much focus on the technologies of indicators, benchmarks, peer 
learning, education reform through cognitive adjustment and the development of policy 
by network and too little attention to the opportunities and constraints for strategic 
actors in activities which might have rather less to do with changing education than we 
might imagine.  
 
The conceptual perspectives of a scale-theoretical approach have been presented and 
explored as a way to address some of the weaknesses of research into EU education 
policy. It seems to me that the unstable and contingent nature of the processes needs to 
be more fully acknowledge because the OMC is ‘in the process of learning its place in 
the political order of the EU, of the member states and international policy making 
arenas’ (Gornitzka, 2005, p. 23) and because the strategic actors involved are ‘still 
searching for the right mode of cooperation’ (Hingel, 2001, p. 11) 
 
This paper has tried to steer a path between two positions. Firstly, a suspicion that the 
negotiation of policy in Brussels places is about little more than the construction of a 
parallel world of policy which has extremely limited significance for the world of 
education system management in the real world of member state education systems. 
Secondly, and in contrast, that the development of EU scalar significance for education 
policy is of fateful importance and that its effects will be felt over the long run. 
Arrowsmith’s sense is that ‘The EU has sufficient political muscle to destabilize 
existing national systems without the strength, in the employment sphere at least, to   15
build alternative EU-wide systems of regulation’ (Arrowsmith et al, 2004, p. 323) 
The question for education then would be what are the implications for spaces and 
places of education when the scale of governance coincides less and less with the scales 
of education provision and funding? We are not there yet and one of the key arguments 
of this paper are that we might never get there, partly because, as Goetschy says, as 
2010 comes and goes and with the ambitions of Lisbon left unfulfilled, ‘a certain 
tiredness of the mobilized actors and institutions and a withering away of certain OMCs 
is not to be excluded’ (Goetschy, 2004, p. 13)   
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